Despite the very positive performance of tokens in the Cosmos ecosystem over the last 90 days, the price of $MARS has lagged far behind the others. In the last 90 days, the value of $MARS has fallen by 2.91%. This is all the more remarkable as the liquidity of the token on Astroport is essentially linked to Neutron. $NTRN, on the other hand, has risen by 84.44% in the last 90 days. In the absence of other influences, the $NTRN token should therefore have ‘pulled’ $MARS along. Due to significant sell-offs in $MARS, it was unfortunately not possible to keep up with this price trend. (fyI: There is some liqudity on Osmosis paired with $OSMO (up 80,07% in the last 90 days) and some with $USDC (not up at all for obvious reasons) on Neutron.
Although this is of course not a nice state of affairs and not exactly a vote of confidence from the current holders of the token (I have not checked whether the current sellers bought the tokens themselves or obtained them elsewhere, but it doesn’t matter), the disappointing price development is not the decisive reason to adjust the tokenomics.
The main reason for adjusting tokenomics is that the current (partly implemented/ partly planned) measures tend to favour holders who are planning for the short term and to offer those who are already selling the best possible exit price. Buy back and LP as well as buy back and burn are extremely short-term mechanisms and only create further exit liquidity.
The following measures should instead be implemented immediately:
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Define a Fixed Liquidity Target on Astroport or Osmosis (MARS/USDC LP):
If liquidity on the DEXs is to be increased, a clear target for the desired LP size must be established, along with the rationale for this target. Liquidity is not an end in itself and incurs opportunity costs. Once the target size is reached, this purpose should cease to be a priority. If there is no target size or no rationale for it, then don’t do it at all. -
Allocate the Remaining 50% to Stakers or a Reserve Controlled by Them:
The remaining 50% of funds should either be distributed to stakers via the appropriate function in DAODAO or placed in a reserve under their control. As soon as the target for the LP is achieved, distribute 100% of the revenue to the stakers or do accrue it it in a treasury. Simultaneously, the DAO’s unstaking duration should be extended to attract long-term-oriented users, who believe in the long-term prospects of the project. (Beyond the misplaced incentives created by Buy Back & Burn, this approach signals weakness, as it is often employed by meme tokens and dying projects as some Hail Mary move.) -
Significantly Increase Transparency for Mars:
It is currently unclear for token stakers what the total salary costs, available reserves, and remaining runway of the project are. Without this information, making informed decisions is effectively impossible. Establishing a strategic reserve could either be entirely unnecessary or absolutely critical, but this cannot be assessed from the outside.
End of post.